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Abstract: Mobile users increasingly make use of
location-based online services enabled by localization
systems. Not only do they share their locations to ob-
tain contextual services in return (e.g., ‘nearest restau-
rant’), but they also share, with their friends, informa-
tion about the venues (e.g., the type, such as a restau-
rant or a cinema) they visit. This introduces an addi-
tional dimension to the threat to location privacy: loca-
tion semantics, combined with location information, can
be used to improve location inference by learning and
exploiting patterns at the semantic level (e.g., people go
to cinemas after going to restaurants). Conversely, the
type of the venue a user visits can be inferred, which
also threatens her semantic location privacy. In this pa-
per, we formalize this problem and analyze the effect of
venue-type information on location privacy. We intro-
duce inference models that consider location semantics
and semantic privacy-protection mechanisms and eval-
uate them by using datasets of semantic check-ins from
Foursquare, totaling more than a thousand users in six
large cities. Our experimental results show that there is
a significant risk for users’ semantic location privacy and
that semantic information improves inference of user lo-
cations.
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1 Introduction
Advanced localization-technologies and continuous In-
ternet connectivity on mobile devices enable people
to adopt an online life style; increasingly more people
use mobile devices to enjoy location-based services and
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location-based social networks. Users of such systems
provide location information to the service providers in
return for useful information, such as the location of the
nearest restaurant, cinema or nearby friends, or simply
to keep their friends posted about their activities. Many
of these services and systems are presented as free, but
in fact, they obtain fine-grained user traces that can
be used to infer more personal information: the price a
user pays for benefiting from such services is her location
data, which is detrimental to her privacy. This problem
has been extensively investigated by the research com-
munity, focusing mostly on geographical location pri-
vacy and related protection mechanisms [1]. Researchers
have also studied how an adversary can locate/track
users’ whereabouts based on location samples that are,
in some cases, anonymized and/or obfuscated, and on
mobility history (e.g., [2, 3]).
Many online service providers interact with their
users on a multidimensional scale. Foursquare, for in-
stance, lets its users check-in at specific nearby venues
(selected from the Foursquare database of registered and
confirmed venues, e.g., ‘Super Duper Burger’ in San
Francisco), attach pictures and messages to their check-
ins and report co-location with other users. Such loca-
tion check-ins by themselves contain geographical in-
formation but also semantic information: For instance,
the aforementioned venue is located at ‘2304 Market
St’ and is tagged as ‘Burger Joint’, which is a sub-
category of ‘Restaurant’, which itself is a sub-category
of ‘Food’ in Foursquare categories (see Figure 2). Hence,
the approach to location privacy from a purely geo-
graphical perspective is not sufficient anymore. Addi-
tional dimensions of information about the activity of
users can be exploited by service providers, thus re-
ducing the effectiveness of existing privacy-protection
mechanisms and threatening users’ privacy. First, se-
mantic information serves as additional location infor-
mation: Knowing that a user is in a restaurant reveals
some information about her location. Second, semantic
information, combined with location information, can
be exploited by learning patterns at the semantic level
(e.g., people go to cinemas after going to restaurants).
Such patterns are already available to (and used by)
Foursquare, which makes next-venue recommendations
to its users, e.g., “Places people like to go after ‘Super
Duper Burger’: ‘Castro Theatre (Movie Theatre, 429
Castro St)’” (see Figure 2).
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I’m at a cinema in
: cloaking area
(a)
: cloaking area
I’m at a cinema in
(b)
: cloaking area
I’m in   
(c)
: cloaking area
I’m in   
(d)
Fig. 1. Illustrative examples of the privacy threat caused by location semantics.(a) A user reports that she is in the depicted cloaking
area and also that she is at a cinema. Her location can be easily pinpointed as there is only one cinema in the user’s reported cloak-
ing area, and this cinema occupies a small area compared to the cloaking area. The situation depicted in (b) demonstrates how the
issue illustrated in (a) can be reduced by enlarging the cloaking area to include another cinema. An adversary can still narrow down the
set of possible locations in the cloaking area, but now there are two locations with the tag cinema. (c) A user at a hospital reports a
cloaking area without revealing her semantic information. As the hospital occupies a large proportion of the cloaking area, an adversary
can infer that she is at a hospital, thus threatening the user’s semantic location privacy. The situation depicted in (d) demonstrates
how semantic location privacy can be protected better by generating large cloaking areas to avoid domination of only one type of loca-
tion in the reported cloaking areas to address the issue illustrated in (c).
Figure 1 depicts two examples where the semantic
dimension (i.e., the venue type) of a location can be
exploited to infer the actual location and where the se-
mantics of the user’s location is not being protected at
all. In Figure 1a, we observe that a user who visits a cin-
ema discloses that she is in the depicted cloaking area
and at a cinema. Because there is only one cinema in
this cloaking area, one can easily pinpoint the user. In
another example, depicted in Figure 1c, a user is at a
hospital and wants to protect her location privacy. Un-
fortunately, her cloaking area is mostly occupied by the
hospital, hence even though her exact location might
not be pinpointed, the fact that she is at a hospital can
be inferred with high confidence.
In this paper, we consider the case where users dis-
close not only their (obfuscated) geographical locations
but also the (obfuscated) types of venue they are at in
the form of check-ins on social networks, e.g., “Restau-
rant, downtown San Francisco”. Previous studies have
shown that such a level of information is often sufficient
for the users [4], except, of course, when the purpose
of the check-in is to become the “mayor” of the venue.
Being able to report such obfuscated information would
require making some modifications on the service. For
instance, users could obfuscate their Foursquare check-
ins and re-post an obfuscated version of them in a tex-
tual message on another social network (e.g., Twitter).
Another solution would be that the service provider re-
turns a list of venues to a user based on her coarse-
grained location and lets her select a coarse-grained se-
Fig. 2. Illustration of the information available to location-based
social networks such as Foursquare: geographical (i.e., address)
and semantic (i.e., venue category) information, semantic mo-
bility profiles (i.e., ‘Places people like to go after. . . ’), etc. The
most relevant pieces of information are circled in red.
mantic information (e.g., “Food and beverage”). Last
but not least, the techniques presented in this work can
help build a tool for warning the users about the pri-
vacy risks associated with their check-ins. We focus on
the semantic dimension of location check-ins and study
its effects on location privacy, both at the geographi-
cal and semantic levels. Note that we consider a rather
weak adversary (see Sections 2.3 and 3.1 for a detailed
description of the adversarial model); therefore, the re-
sults presented in the paper constitute a lower bound
in terms of the privacy loss stemming from semantic
information.
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To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to confront, through data-driven experimentation, se-
mantic information and semantic-aware location pri-
vacy protection mechanisms with a practical attack con-
ducted by a concrete adversary. In a nutshell, we formal-
ize the problem and build specific Bayesian networks
to model users’ behavior on which an adversary runs
his inference attacks and we experimentally evaluate
both geographical and semantic location privacy under
such an adversarial model. In our experiments, we use
the semantically-annotated location traces composed of
Foursquare check-ins (collected through Twitter’s pub-
lic stream) of hundreds of users distributed across six
large cities in North America and Europe. We also rely
on a predictive utility model for obfuscated Foursquare
check-ins [4]. We show that disclosing information about
the type of visited locations, i.e., semantic location-
information, decreases geographical location privacy by
more than 50% (see Figure 5). For instance, in the ex-
treme case where users disclose the precise type of venue
they are at, their location privacy drops by 55% (from
420 m to 190 m). We also present the threat on seman-
tic location privacy that deteriorates quickly as the ad-
versary gains background information on user-mobility
profiles, that are easy to build by crawling data pub-
licly available on various social networks. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work that quantifies
semantic location privacy and demonstrates the effects
of location semantics on location privacy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
We introduce the reader to the context and define the
system model in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our
adversarial model, inference approach and describe how
we measure privacy. We explain our experimental setup
and the datasets in Section 4 and report the evaluation
results. In Section 5, we discuss the limitations of our
approach and we propose improvement as future work.
In Section 6, we survey related work. Finally, we con-
clude the paper and discuss future work in Section 7.
2 Background and System Model
We consider mobile users equipped with smartphones
that have localization capabilities and Internet connec-
tivity. These users move in a geographical area and
make use of location-based online services. We consider
that users sporadically report their (potentially obfus-
cated) locations and, in some cases, semantic informa-
tion (i.e., the type, in the form of tags such as ‘restau-
rant’) of their locations. In this setting, we consider an
honest-but-curious service provider that is interested in
inferring, based on his observations, users’ actual ge-
ographical locations and the semantic tags associated
with them, if any. Table 1 lists the notations used in the
paper. Our model is built on top of Shokri et al.’s [3];
we detail the differences in Section 6.
2.1 Users
Mobile users with GPS-equipped connected devices
move in a given geographical area that is partitioned
into M non-overlapping geographical regions/cells R =
{R1, R2, . . . RM}. Geographical regions are usually
coarse-grained (typically cells associated with cell tow-
ers or regular square tiles of a several hundreds of
meters). A subset of, or all, the regions in R con-
tain venues annotated with semantic tags from the set
{S1, S2, . . . , SK}, i.e., a predefined list of categories
(e.g., Foursquare defines such a list, organized as a tree,1
and all registered venues are tagged with such a cat-
egory). Whenever a venue is visited by a user, it is
mapped to the geographical region from R it falls in.
We denote by ⊥ the semantics of regions for the case
when a user is in a geographical region, but does not
visit a particular venue with a semantic tag, meaning
that her location does not have semantic information.
Hence, we define the set S of semantic tags as the union
{S1, S2, . . . , SK}∪{⊥} to cover all semantic cases. More-
over, we consider discrete time instants over a limited-
time period {1, . . . , T}. Note that the notion of venue
types was introduced in the work of Shokri et al. [5].
As users move, they sporadically use online services
and share their (potentially obfuscated) locations to-
gether with the corresponding (potentially obfuscated)
semantic tags. Formally, whenever a user u visits a ge-
ographical region r at a time instant t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, she
generates an event consisting of her actual geographical
region r ∈ R and a corresponding semantic tag s ∈ S.
This user event at time t is denoted by au(t) = (r, s);
in other words, the actual location of user u at time in-
stant t is represented by the pair (r, s). We denote by
au = {au(1) . . . au(T )} the whole trace of user u.
1 https://developer.foursquare.com/categorytree. Last visited:
sep. 2015
2 P: Power set.
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Table 1. Table of Notations.
R Set of geographical regions
S Set of semantic tags
au(t)=(rt, st) User u’s actual location at time instant t,
where r ∈ R and s ∈ S
ou(t)=(r′t, s′t) User u’s obfuscated location at time in-
stant t, where r′ ∈ P(R)2
au Actual trace of user u
ou Obfuscated trace of user u
Rt,R′t The actual and obfuscated geographical lo-
cation variables for time t
St,S′t The actual and obfuscated semantic loca-
tion variables for time t
hu(r, r′, s, s′) A PPM modeled as a probability distribu-
tion function (PDF) employed by user u
(decomposed into fu(r, r′) and gu(s, s′))
qg, qs The PDF output by the inference attack
distG(·, ·),
distS(·, ·)
Geographical and semantic distance met-
rics used for quantifying privacy
GPu(t),SPu(t) User u’s geographical and semantic loca-
tion privacy at time t
2.2 Privacy Protection Mechanisms
For privacy reasons, users employ privacy-protection
mechanisms (PPMs) before reporting their location and
semantic information to an online service provider3
Their privacy goal is to prevent the adversary from in-
ferring at what geographical location and in what type
of venue they are at. Typically, a PPM, that aims to
protect the geographical location of a user, replaces her
actual location with another location (i.e., perturbs the
location) or with a list of locations (i.e., a cloak), or
hides the location information completely. In this work,
we consider such PPMs and the PPMs that protect the
semantic dimension of the location, specifically the se-
mantic tag of a user’s event. In particular, these PPMs
generalize the semantic tag (i.e., report a parent tag
of the venue’s actual tag, w.r.t. a tag hierarchy, e.g., re-
place ‘Burger joint’ with ‘Restaurant’4 or ‘Food’) or hide
it completely. We assume that a set of PPMs obfuscates
a user’s actual event at time t independently from her
other events at other time instants. Such a PPM model
can also cover the cases where the underlying localiza-
tion technique used by the adversary returns coarse-
grained and possibly bogus information about the users.
3 In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the online service
provider as the service provider or the adversary for short.
4 Note that this is strictly equivalent to reporting the sets of all
tags that are sub-categories of tag ‘Restaurant’
After applying PPMs on her actual geographical re-
gion r and the corresponding actual semantic tag s, a
user u reports her obfuscated geographical region r′ and
the obfuscated semantic tag s′ to the service provider.
r′ (resp. s′) is typically a subset of R (resp. S). We
assume that the service provider only observes the ob-
fuscated trace ou = {ou(t) = (r′, s′)},∀t ∈ {1 . . . T}
of user u. We model a PPM as a probability distri-
bution function that maps actual events to obfuscated
ones (note that in the case of generalization, the PPM
is deterministic). Specifically, we denote by functions
h(r, r′, s, s′) the probabilities to generate the obfuscated
location/semantic tag r′, s′(i.e., Pr(r′, s′|r, s)) that con-
stitute the obfuscated event ou(t) = (r′, s′) given the
actual event au(t) = (r, s). Note that the location of a
user at a given time instant is obfuscated independently
from the other time instants.
Finally, we do not consider collaboration between
users to protect their privacy (and prevent loss of pri-
vacy from each other). In addition, we assume that
users’ events are not anonymized.
2.3 Adversary
The adversary we consider in this paper is typically a
service provider or an external observer who has access
to obfuscated traces of users. He has two main purposes:
(1) locate users at specific time instants, and (2) iden-
tify the types of the locations a user visits at specific
time instants, in terms of the semantic tags associated
with them. While carrying out his attack, the adversary
takes into account the relationship between geograph-
ical and semantic dimensions of location, as explained
in Section 3. Note that the inference process described
below also applies to other adversaries such as users’
friends and third party services on which users’ check-
ins are reposted (e.g., Twitter). However, the amount
and the granularity of the information that is available
to them can be more limited.
The adversary runs his attack a posteriori, i.e., af-
ter having observed the whole obfuscated trace ou of a
user u. Even though the obfuscation of an event is done
independently from the other events of the user, the
adversary assumes that a user’s actual events are corre-
lated and therefore models the users’ mobility/behavior.
He is assumed to have access to users’ (partial) past
events that he exploits to build a mobility profile for
each user u, on both the geographical and semantic
dimensions. Essentially, a user’s mobility profile repre-
sents the user’s transition probabilities over successive
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time instants, i.e., between geographical regions and be-
tween semantic tags. Formally, such a mobility profile
(under a first-order Markovian assumption) is the set of
the probability distribution functions Pr(r|ρ), Pr(s|σ)
and Pr(r|s), where ρ and σ represent the user’s previous
location and semantic tag (as explained in Section 3).
The adversary also knows which PPMs a user u em-
ploys and with what parameter(s), i.e., the function hu.
Together with the PPMs and the mobility profile he
generates, the adversary performs his attack on a user
trace given her obfuscated trace ou.
3 Inference and Privacy
We explain our model of inference and background
knowledge of the adversary in the subsequent subsec-
tion. In summary, we build two user behavior models
by using Bayesian networks [6, 7] under the assumption
that people follow a bi-modal Markovian mobility pro-
cess5 (along the geographical and semantic dimensions)
which we describe below. These models take into ac-
count both the geographical and semantic dimensions
of the location and also the relationship between them.
Based on these two models, we evaluate geographical
and semantic location privacy.
3.1 Inference and Background Knowledge
We assume that the adversary uses the following simple
behavioral user model in the inference process6: Users
move based on what they plan to do next given their
current context, i.e., in this case, their locations and
semantic information. We determine the following two
scenarios (illustrated in Figure 3):
1. The adversary knows the users’ geographical tran-
sition profile, i.e., the geographical background, and
assumes that the users move to new locations pri-
marily based on their current locations. The type of
place they visit (i.e., semantic tags) depend only on
5 This means that a user’s events at a given time instant only
depend only on that user’s event at the immediate past time
instant.
6 Note that the user traces we use in our experiments are real
and are not generated from this model. Therefore, the fact that
the considered user models rely on a set of simplifying assump-
tions limits the performance of the inference; as such, the exper-
imental results presented in this paper constitute a lower bound
of the privacy implications of semantic information.
their current locations. For instance, a user might go
to a location in downtown after visiting another lo-
cation in nearby downtown. The semantics of these
locations then, for instance, might happen to be a
cinema and a restaurant.
2. The adversary knows both the users’ geographical
and semantic transition profiles, together referred to
as geographical & semantic background. Unlike the
first scenario, in this case the user first determines
what type of place she will go to (i.e., her next activ-
ity, characterized by the semantic tag of the venue
she visits next) given the semantic tag of her cur-
rent location, and then chooses the region she will
go to based on the determined next semantic tag
and her current location. For instance, if a user is
at a restaurant in downtown and wants to go to a
cinema, she chooses to go to a cinema that is close
to her current location (that she often visits).
For the sake of simplicity for our experimentation, from
this point on, we assume that geographical and seman-
tic information are obfuscated independently from each
other, using two functions fu and gu respectively (note
that it is straightforward to include such joint PPMs in
our formalism). Joint PPMs could be used to avoid the
situations where a user reports a set of geographical lo-
cations and a semantic tag such that only some of the
reported locations contain a venue with this tag.
We elaborate more on our scenarios and their re-
spective Bayesian networks in the following sections.
Time
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Fig. 3. The Bayesian networks representing the user models em-
ployed by the adversary. Nodes denote random variables and
edges denote probabilistic dependencies between them (e.g., the
arrow from R1 to R′1 corresponds to the obfuscation function
fu). The model on the left-hand side prioritizes geographical
transitions with only geographical background known to the ad-
versary. The model on the right-hand side prioritizes semantic
transitions over geographical transitions with both geographical
and semantic background. Protection mechanisms work sepa-
rately on regions and semantic tags and they are independent.
 - 10.1515/popets-2016-0034
Downloaded from PubFactory at 07/26/2016 04:31:31PM
via Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne  and EPFL Bibliotheque
On the Privacy Implications of Location Semantics 170
3.1.1 Geographical-Only Background
As stated previously, the adversary has access to the
users’ geographical transition profile (built from past
traces) in this scenario and carries out his attack by us-
ing (only7) this information as background information.
He can correlate the sequential events of a user by using
geographical background information, hence we build a
Bayesian network in which only the region (i.e., the ge-
ographical location) nodes are connected to each other
among user events. As the adversary still wants to in-
fer the semantic tags in the user events, semantic nodes
are also created and they are dependent on the region
nodes. This ensures that the adversary benefits from
the semantic information disclosed by the users in his
inference, even though he does not have any semantic
background information.
This model is illustrated in Figure 3 (left), where
each line of nodes represent a user event in time,
both actual (Rt,St) and obfuscated (R′t,S′t), where
Rt, St, R′t and S′t represent the random variables for
a user’s actual and obfuscated events at time t. The
conditional probability distributions for the obfuscated
events’, i.e., for R′t and S′t), are the privacy-protection
mechanism distributions fu and gu, explained in Section
2.2. If a static privacy-protection mechanism (PPM) is
used by the users, then these functions map the ac-
tual regions and the actual semantic tags to obfuscated
regions and obfuscated semantic tags with probability
1 (i.e., for a given region, resp. a semantic tag, the
PPM always generates the same obfuscation outcome).
More powerful PPMs can be employed and used in this
network, e.g., hiding the actual information completely
with a given hiding probability.
The remaining conditional probabilities are those of
the user’s actual semantic tag given her actual location
Pr(S|R) and the user’s next location given her current
location Pr(Rt+1|Rt). We calculate Pr(S|R) based on
the semantic tags’ associations to regions as the adver-
sary is assumed to have no semantic background infor-
mation. Essentially, Pr(S|R) represents a uniform dis-
tribution over all semantic tags associated with a re-
gion r, e.g., if a region has 4 semantic tags associated
with it, then the probability for each of these tags to
be the actual tag given this location is 0.25. Lastly, we
compute Pr(Rt+1|Rt) by counting the number of tran-
7 The purpose of considering such a limited adversary, used as
a baseline, is solely to show the inference power of semantic
background used in Section 3.1.2.
sitions among all regions in a user trace and then using
the knowledge construction approach from [3].
3.1.2 Geographical and Semantic Background
In this scenario, we consider an adversary that models
user mobility-behavior in an activity-driven fashion: A
user first determines the type (i.e., the semantic tag)
of her next geographical region given the type of her
current geographical region; then, she determines the
next geographical region given her current geographical
region and the next semantic tag. For example, a user
decides to go to a restaurant, then she chooses which
restaurant she wants to go to. Afterwards, she decides
to go to a cinema, as she usually does after going to a
restaurant. Considering her previous location, she picks
the cinema that is most convenient for her. This model
is depicted in Fig. 3 on the right-hand side.
The conditional probability distributions for the ob-
fuscated events (i.e., R′t and S′t) are the same as in the
scenario with only the geographical background knowl-
edge. The transitions between user events, however, now
require a semantic-transition distribution (Pr(St+1|St))
and a geographical-transition distribution, which is also
conditioned on the semantics of the next user-event
(Pr(Rt+1|Rt,St+1)), meaning that Rt+1 depends on
the user’s current semantic tag St+1 and her previous
geographical region Rt.
The semantic transition distribution Pr(St+1|St) is
constructed in the same way the geographical transi-
tion distribution Pr(Rt+1|Rt) is constructed. However,
as we consider geographical and semantic background
information separately, the adversary is assumed not to
know the distribution Pr(Rt+1|Rt,St+1). In short, the
adversary is assumed to have knowledge onPr(St+1|St),
Pr(Rt+1|Rt) and Pr(Rt|St) to some extent regarding
user history. Therefore, he needs to use Pr(Rt|St) and
Pr(Rt+1|Rt) to derive Pr(Rt+1|Rt,St+1). We achieve
this simply by normalizing the marginal probability
distribution Pr{Rt+1|Rt} for a given semantic tag s
(i.e., over regions that have s) and by combining it with
the conditional distribution Pr(Rt|St = s). For the rest
of the geographical regions, i.e., those that do not have
the semantic tag s, the probability is zero. This trans-
lates into the following formula:
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Pr(Rt+1 = r|Rt = ρ,St+1 = s) = (1)
0 if s /∈ r
α
Pr(Rt+1 = r|Rt = ρ)∑
Rm s.t. s∈Rm
Pr(Rt+1 = Rm|Rt = ρ)
+ (1− α) ·Pr(Rt+1 = r|St+1 = s)
otherwise
where Rm denotes the set of regions that contain at least
one venue with tag s and α is a factor to set the weight
of geographical transitions against the probability that
Rt+1 is r given St+1 = s (which is derived from the num-
ber of visits to a region r given the semantic tag s in the
user history). In other words, α is used to control how
much importance is distributed among different types
of user history, i.e., geographical transitions and steady
user events. In our experiments, we set α to 0.5, which
we believe is a balanced treatment of user history.8 Note
that considering geographical and semantic background
information separately enables the adversary to exploit
the semantic mobility of a user’s behavior data in one
city to infer user events in another city, where he might
lack the knowledge.
Note that the aforementioned models might not re-
flect the users’ actual behaviors. However, such models
(in particular the Markovian mobility assumption) are
widely used in practice (and considered in the literature)
as they enable the adversary to develop efficient algo-
rithmic and computational methods to infer the users’
locations. The accuracy of the inference attack carried
out by the adversary partially depends on how well the
user model fits the users’ actual behaviors.
3.2 Privacy Measurement
Due to different privacy concerns in both geographical
and semantic dimensions of location, we measure the
privacy level in both dimensions separately. Privacy lev-
els in both dimensions are measured as a function of the
expected error of the adversary. The inference based on
our Bayesian networks yields probability distributions
over regions and semantics that fit this measurement
approach. In other words, the output of the inference
algorithm is a probability distribution function (PDF)
8 We ran test experiments with different values of α; we ob-
served only small variations (∼ 5%) of the median error, with
better results for large values of α (> 0.5).
for each node in a given Bayesian network, i.e., the PDF
qg over all regions at every time instant for user loca-
tion and the PDF qs over all semantic tags at every time
instant for user semantic tag. The geographical and se-
mantic privacy levels of a user u at time instant t, de-
noted by GPu(t) and SPu(t), are computed as follows:
GPu(t) =
M∑
m=1
qg(Rm, t) · distG(Rm, r), (2)
SPu(t) =
K∑
k=1
qs(Sk, t) · distS(Sk, s), (3)
where distG(·, ·) and distS(·, ·) are geographical and se-
mantic distance functions, and (r, s) is the actual event
of user u at time instant t.
We use the Euclidean distance (in the projected co-
ordinate system, i.e., Universal Transverse Mercator or
UTM)9 to compute the geographical distances between
two regions by using the projected coordinates of their
respective center points. We use the distance metric d(·)
from graph-theory (i.e., the length of the shortest path
between two nodes) on the category tree to compute the
semantic distance between two tags, meaning that if two
semantic tags are equal, then the distance is 0, if they
have the same parent tag (e.g., ‘American restaurant’
and ‘Burger joint’ are both children categories of the
‘Restaurant’ category), the distance is 2, etc. We nor-
malize the semantic distance between two tags by the
sum of the tags’ depths (i.e., the distance to the root).
distS(s, s′) = d(s, s
′)
d(‘venue’, s) + d(‘venue’, s′)
This distance function takes into account the fact that,
as one goes deeper in the tree, the graph-distance de-
notes a less significant semantic difference. For instance,
“Italian Restaurants” and “American Restaurants” are
not so different but “Food” and “Travel place” are.
4 Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate privacy on a real dataset
of user traces composed of location check-ins that con-
tain not only geographical location data but also se-
mantic information in most cases (see Section 4.1). In
9 Note that we did not take elevation into account in the com-
putation of the geographical distance.
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our experiments, we study the effects of location seman-
tics on the geographical location privacy by comparing
the privacy of users under a semantic-oblivious and a
semantic-aware inference attack, in various configura-
tions and with different PPM settings.
4.1 Dataset
In order to experimentally evaluate users’ semantic lo-
cation privacy and the effect of semantic information
on users’ location privacy, we rely on a dataset of real
user check-ins, which include geographical and semantic
information about the venues visited by the users of a
large location-based social network. In addition, we rely
on a predictive utility model based on user feedback col-
lected through a personalized online survey targeted at
Foursquare users (N = 77) recruited via the Amazon
Mechanical Turk platform. This dataset was collected
by the authors of [4] and made available online at https:
//homepages.laas.fr/khugueni/drupal/datasets. In this
section, we give details about our data sources, including
the data collection, filtering and processing methodol-
ogy and general descriptive statistics about the data.
4.1.1 Location Traces with Semantics
Because we could not find large datasets of user check-
ins with semantic information, we built our own dataset
by running a data collection campaign through crawl-
ing. As a starting point, we use a tweet dataset we col-
lected between January 2015 and July 2015 through
Twitter’s public stream. The dataset contains public
geo-tagged tweets (i.e., Twitter lets users to attach their
GPS coordinates to their tweets); we focused on six large
cities: Boston (MA, USA), Chicago (IL, USA), Istanbul
(Turkey), London (UK), New York (NY, USA) and San
Francisco (CA, USA). We collected these tweets by iden-
tifying users through Twitter’s public stream (i.e., ∼1%
of the Twitter public timeline) and by fetching time-
lines of these users. A summary of the statistics of the
dataset is provided in Table 2: We collected location
check-in traces of a total of 1065 users. As we collected
only public data and we neither interacted with the user
nor inferred information not present in the dataset, IRB
approval was not required.
The coordinates embedded in the geo-tagged tweets,
however, do not contain semantic information (which
we need for our evaluation). To obtain such informa-
tion, we rely on Foursquare. Foursquare offers its users
Table 2. Filtered Dataset Statistics
City Users Tweets Check-ins
Boston 79 6,687 5,276
Chicago 136 14,248 11,755
Istanbul 196 22,203 17,005
London 239 18,685 15,018
New York 242 21,249 14,240
San Francisco 173 16,739 13,650
Table 3. Experimental Setup
Number of iterations 10
Size of each area 2.4× 1.6 km
(12× 8 cells)
Average Proportion of Foursquare tweets per
user (i.e., tweets w/ semantic information)
77%
the option of linking their Foursquare accounts with
their Twitter accounts in such a way that, whenever a
user checks-in, Foursquare generates an automatic text
message with a short URL to the Foursquare check-
in and tweets it, along with the GPS coordinates, on
the user’s Twitter timeline. We select such Foursquare-
generated tweets from our Twitter dataset and, for each,
we parse the URL to the Foursquare check-in from the
tweet text. Using these URLs, we fetch (through the
Foursquare API) the corresponding check-in and the
venue. For each venue referenced in a check-in of our
dataset, we collect rich statistical information such as
total number of visits, total unique visitors, rating, etc.
Most importantly, we collect the coordinates10 and the
semantic tag(s) (a primary tag and possibly a secondary
tag), selected from a pre-defined set of 763 tags (i.e., re-
ferred to as Foursquare categories) organized as a tree
(see Figure 13 of the Appendices, on page 182, for a
snapshot of the tree), assigned to the venue. We used
Foursquare’s definition and implementation of location
semantics as is. The results of our evaluation are de-
pendent of the underlying semantic model; investigating
alternative definitions of location semantics and other
categorizations (e.g., from Facebook) is an interesting
lead for future work. Because it uses semantic tags (or-
ganized as a tree) and because its main feature is to
let users check-in at venues, Foursquare constitutes a
perfect data source for our evaluation. Note that, un-
like in works such as Krumm’s [8] in which semantic
10 Note that GPS coordinates in the tweets might slightly differ
from registered venue coordinates at Foursquare. In such cases,
we use the coordinates of the venues from Foursquare.
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information is inferred from the users’ location traces,
we use only ground-truth semantic data extracted from
the users’ check-ins. We show the venue density and the
Foursquare tweet density in the considered cities in Fig-
ure 14 (Appendices, p. 183), which shows a Foursquare
venue heat map and a Foursquare check-in heat map.
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um
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Total number of tweets
Fig. 4. Number of Foursquare check-ins/tweets and the total
number of tweets per user (in decreasing order) in the filtered
dataset used in our experiments (log-scale on the y-axis).
In our evaluation, we focus (due to computational
limitations) on the tweets and check-ins in small geo-
graphical areas of size approximately 2.4×1.6 km around
the cities of Boston, Chicago, Istanbul, London, New
York and San Francisco. We define one such area around
each of the six cities, and we divide each of them into 96
cells by using a regular grid of 12× 8 cells (each of size
200 × 200 m). We determine the most dense such ar-
eas and extract users with at least 40 tweets in each
region. We further filter out users whose Foursquare
tweets (i.e., check-ins) account for 1]less than 50% of
all their tweets (i.e., most of the tweets used in the ex-
periments contain venue information). The final dataset
contains a total of 1065 users (57% male, 41% female,
2% unknown); see Table 2 for detailed statistics and Fig-
ure 4 for users’ count of Foursquare and total tweets. We
included all the tweets of a user in the knowledge con-
struction of the adversary and for each user we use a
randomly selected sub-trace of length 5 in each exper-
iment. There are 10,970 venues in our filtered dataset
and the tag distribution over these venues is shown in
Figure 12 (Appendices, p. 182).
Dissemination of the dataset
Although the terms and conditions of Twitter11 and
Foursquare12 prevent us from making the dataset di-
rectly available for automatic download as we need to
make sure that the requesting party agrees to comply
with the aforementioned terms, we will be happy to pro-
vide our dataset (and the script used for collecting data)
to other researchers upon request.
The dataset contains all the considered check-ins,
each of which is characterized by a timestamp, a user
id, a geographical location (as reported in the tweet),
a geographical location (as reported in the Foursquare
venue information), and the Foursquare venue type in
the form of a tag, and will be made available in the csv
file format. It will also contain a snapshot of Foursquare
category tree at the time of data collection.
4.1.2 Predictive Utility Model
Semantic obfuscation, usually achieved through gener-
alization as discussed in the previous sections, is likely
to have a negative effect on the utility of the service
as perceived by the users. As the notion of (perceived)
utility is quite subjective, user feedback is needed to
model and quantify the utility implications of the use of
obfuscation techniques. In order to build such a model,
we rely on a dataset collected and made available by
the authors of [4]. The fact that the survey focuses on
Foursquare check-ins makes it perfectly adequate for our
dataset and hence for our evaluation. In this work, the
authors performed a personalized survey with 77 active
Foursquare users recruited through Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk. In the survey, each participant was shown 45
of her own past Foursquare check-ins; for each of these
check-ins, the participant was presented with four dif-
ferent obfuscated versions of the check-in and she was
requested to rate, on a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is
“not at all” and 5 is “perfectly”), to what extent the
purpose of her check-in would still be met if the precise
venue location was replaced with the obfuscated ver-
sion of it. The four obfuscated versions of the check-in
were generated by applying the possible combinations of
low/high semantic obfuscation (Ls or Hs) and low/high
geographical obfuscation (Lg or Hg) as illustrated in Ta-
ble 5 (Appendices, p. 183, extracted from the original
11 https://dev.twitter.com/overview/terms/agreement-and-
policy
12 https://developer.foursquare.com/overview/venues
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article). One finding from the article is that semantic
obfuscation has a higher negative effect on utility than
geographical obfuscation does.
Using this data, to predict the utility of an obfus-
cated version of a check-in (on a discrete scale from 1
to 5), the authors propose a utility model that relies on
a number of features extracted from the users’ check-in,
including the check-in location, date, time, text, and the
venue type. The predictive model proposed in the origi-
nal paper achieves high accuracy with a median error of
around 0.5. In order to quantify utility, we build a sim-
plified version of the predictive utility model proposed
in [4] (based on the same data). Our model is based on
only two different features: the venue type and the ob-
fuscation level. The median error of our simplified model
is 1.1, which is sufficient for our purpose (i.e., exploring
the privacy-utility trade-off).
4.2 Experimental Setup
Methodology:
We partitioned each of the six considered areas (one for
each city considered in the dataset) into 96 cells, each
identified by an ID, using an 12× 8 regular square grid.
We then mapped the locations in the users’ traces to the
corresponding region IDs, and we kept the semantic tag.
We implemented our Bayesian network-based models in
Python by using the Bayesian Belief Networks library
provided by eBay [9]. We applied certain protection ap-
proaches (listed below) on the users’ traces, obtaining
protected/observed traces that our Bayesian networks
use as observations, and applied the junction-tree in-
ference algorithm [10] which achieves optimal inference.
The output of the inference algorithm is a probability
distribution function for each unknown (inferred) vari-
able, which we use in our privacy metrics (see Equa-
tions (2) and (3)).
Background Knowledge:
In our experiments, the adversary always has geo-
graphical background knowledge on the users’ history
(i.e., transitions). Based on this we have two different
scenarios (explained in detail in Section 3.1):
1. Geographical Background: In this scenario, the
adversary is assumed to have knowledge on geo-
graphical transition patterns of users and no seman-
tic background information. We run experiments for
this scenario by using our first Bayesian network
model that prioritizes the geographical transitions
for user behavior introduced in Section 3.1. The
transition probabilities are estimated from the num-
ber of geographical transitions in the whole traces
of users.
2. Geographical and Semantic Background: The
adversary is assumed to have more knowledge about
users’ histories: transitions in both geographical and
semantic dimensions. He also knows the distribution
of geographical region visits, given the semantic in-
formation on user traces, i.e., how many times a
region r was visited, given that the user event’s se-
mantic tag was s. This type of background informa-
tion enables us to use our second Bayesian network
model that prioritizes the semantic transitions for
event sequences, meaning that the users move by
first choosing the semantic tag of the location they
want to go to and then determine a geographical
region associated with this semantic tag based on
their previous location.
In many cases, such information can be obtained by the
service provider. In cases where only little background
information about individual users is available, the ser-
vice provider can aggregate data across users with sim-
ilar profiles.
Protection Mechanisms:
We implement geographical and semantic location pri-
vacy protection approaches separately, meaning that ge-
ographical protection does not take into account the se-
mantic information of the user’s actual location, and
vice versa. As mentioned above, joint protection mecha-
nisms could be used for improved performance; we leave
the design of such mechanisms to future work.
We implement a geographical location-privacy pro-
tection mechanism as an obfuscation mechanism that
either generates an obfuscation area of a certain size or
hides the geographical location completely with a prede-
termined probability (called the hiding probability λ).
This mechanism replaces any given region (i.e., the ac-
tual location of a user) with a larger, square area in our
map. For instance, a 2× 2 obfuscation: (i) with proba-
bility 1−λ, generates an obfuscation area consisting of 4
adjacent regions/cells, one being the actual location of
the user, or (ii) with probability λ, hides the location.
We consider the following four scenarios regarding
the semantic protection and, to compare their effects,
employ each of them in separate experiments:
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1. No protection. In this case, we directly disclose
the actual semantic tag all the time. From a privacy
perspective, this constitutes a worst-case scenario.
2. Parent-tag obfuscation. This is a generaliza-
tion based on the semantic tag tree derived from
Foursquare’s category hierarchy. In this case, given
the actual semantic tag of the user, we determine its
parent tag in the tree and disclose this tag as the se-
mantic information of the user’s current location. It
has been shown, for Foursquare check-ins, that re-
porting the parent tag of a venue is often sufficient
to meet the purpose of the original check-in [4].
3. Parent-tag obfuscation with hiding. In this
case, we disclose the parent tag of the user’s location
with probability 1−λ or hide the semantic informa-
tion completely with hiding probability λ.
4. Complete hiding of semantic tags [baseline].
In this case, we never disclose semantic tags. This
corresponds to a pure geographical approach (as
taken in previous works); as such it constitutes our
baseline.
In our experiments, we employ the geographical protec-
tion mechanism in combination with each of the afore-
mentioned semantic protection mechanisms with vary-
ing hiding probabilities.
4.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we analyze the experimental results with
different protection mechanisms in various settings.
4.3.1 Effect of Semantic Information on Location
Privacy
We first analyze the effect of adding semantic informa-
tion to a user’s check-in on her geographical location
privacy. We consider four protection scenarios with low
to high granularity of semantic information combined
with fixed geographical obfuscation over gradual hiding
probability λ. Specifically, given a geographical obfus-
cation parameter (e.g., 2×2 obfuscation), for each λ we
evaluate four different semantic protection approaches
(explained in Section 4.2) that are employed together
with the obfuscation mechanism.
We present the results in Figure 5, where the x-
axis represents the hiding probability λ (used for geo-
graphical obfuscation and parent-tag semantic general-
ization) and the y-axis represents the geographical lo-
cation privacy in kilometers (i.e., the distance between
a user’s actual discretized location and that inferred by
the adversary, as described in Equation (2)). A privacy
of a few hundreds of meters (typically a city-block) pro-
vides a reasonable protection against precise localiza-
tion/tracking and limits the possibility to infer the ex-
act place a user visits or her exact address. We plot the
geographical location privacy aggregated over all users,
all events and all iterations of simulations for each pro-
tection mechanism and hiding probability (λ) pair using
box plots. These box plots show the 1st, 2nd, 3rd quar-
tiles of the data and the 98% confidence intervals.
We consider four scenarios (geographical obfusca-
tion and semantic generalization) and plot the corre-
sponding results, e.g., “Geo. (obf 2× 2, λ) | Sem. (par-
ent, λ)” means that (1) geographical locations are hid-
den with probability λ and obfuscated by reporting 2×2
cloaking areas otherwise, and (2) semantic tags are hid-
den with probability λ and generalized by reporting the
parent tag otherwise; the darker a box-plot is, the higher
the amount of disclosed information is. In our experi-
ments, we employed both 2× 2 and 4× 4 cloaking.13
We observe that as we disclose more semantic infor-
mation, along with the obfuscated geographical location
(from left to right for each λ value), the median location
privacy consistently decreases in all cases. For instance,
it can be observed in Figure 5c (λ = 1), that disclosing
the actual semantic tag decreases the median location
privacy by 55% (from 420 m to 190 m) and disclosing
the parent tag decreases it by 43%. Also, unsurprisingly,
the privacy level increases as we increase the granularity
of the location (i.e., from 2× 2 obfuscation in Figure 5a
to 4×4 obfuscation in Figure 5b). Note that for λ = 1.0,
the parent-tag generalization with hiding probability λ
is exactly the same as hiding the semantic information
completely and, similarly, it is exactly the same as the
direct parent-tag generalization (i.e., always disclosing
the parent tag instead of the actual tag) for λ = 0.0.
These can be observed in Figure 5.
We also analyze the effect of employing semantic
background information (i.e., the histories of users’ tran-
sitions between semantic tags) in the inference process,
in addition to the geographical background informa-
tion that is already employed in all our experiments.
We compare the two scenarios where 4× 4 geographical
obfuscation with hiding probability λ is used (i.e., Fig-
13 We acknowledge the fact that 4×4 cloaking is rather large
compared to the size of the grid. We intend to consider larger
grids as part of future work.
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(c) 4× 4 Obfuscation w/ Sem. Background
Fig. 5. Geographical location privacy levels over different protection and learning scenarios.
ures 5b and 5c, with and without semantic background
information respectively). We observe that, for instance
in the case of λ = 0.4, the median geographical pri-
vacy decreases when the adversary employs the semantic
background information of users. This pattern is visible
for most of the cases from without semantic background
to with semantic background. It can also be observed
that the semantic background information is very influ-
ential on geographical location privacy in the cases of
direct parent-tag generalization and semantic disclosure
(i.e., the two darkest boxes). We notice that, in some
cases (typically for the light case where the semantic in-
formation is hidden all the time), the adversary is more
confused (and hence less successful) when he employs
semantic background knowledge. The main reason for
this outcome is that the adversary’s knowledge on the
semantic transitions of the user is less effective in his
attack when the attacked traces’ length is short. In gen-
eral, we observe that employing semantic background
knowledge in the inference helps the adversary increase
his median accuracy by 10 to 115 meters when the users
disclose some semantic information in their traces. This
is clear in Figure 7, that shows the difference between
Figures 5b and 5c (i.e., the information gain of the ad-
versary between the two scenarios). The reason why the
adversary gains more information in the case of parent-
tag obfuscation compared to no semantic protection is
that when users disclose their semantic tags, their pri-
vacy level is already lower; hence the potential informa-
tion gain of the adversary in with semantic background
scenario is naturally lower.
Figure 6 depicts the average geographical location
privacy in each of the six considered cities (with and
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Fig. 6. Average geographical location privacy over all users in
each considered city.
without semantic background, aggregated over all val-
ues of λ and over the two sizes of the cloaking area).
It can be observed that it is quite comparable among
cities: Despite the difference in terms of culture and
urban planning, we did not observe major differences
across cities in terms of user privacy in the presence
of semantic information. It can also be observed that
semantic background information improves the perfor-
mance of the inference, thus decreasing users’ geograph-
ical location privacy. Note that our experiments include
some randomness and as a result, in some situations
(e.g., New York) the background information slightly
misleads the adversary.
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Fig. 7. Difference of geographical location-privacy levels between
the cases with semantic background and without semantic back-
ground with 4 × 4 geographical obfuscation and varying λ. As
soon as users disclose some semantic information, the perfor-
mance of the inference increase when using semantic background
information about users. Interestingly, when users completely hide
the semantic tags of their locations, the adversary is less success-
ful when he uses the semantic background information.
4.3.2 Privacy vs. Utility Trade-Off
We now explore the trade-off between privacy and util-
ity by evaluating both location privacy and utility for
different levels of obfuscation. To comply with the ex-
perimental setup of [4], we consider four protection
mechanisms by combining a low or high level of seman-
tic obfuscation with a low or high level of geographical
obfuscation as described in Table 4 and illustrated in
Figure 8. We set the hiding probability λ to 0.2.
Table 4. Description of the different obfuscation levels.
Obfuscation Description
Ls-Lg Semantic tag, 2× 2 geographical region
Hs-Lg Parent semantic tag, 2× 2 geographical region
Ls-Hg Semantic tag, 4× 4 geographical region
Hs-Hg Parent semantic tag, 4× 4 geographical region
We plot the results in Figure 9. The points repre-
sent the average privacy and utility. It can be observed
that the four points corresponding to the different ob-
fuscation levels form a diamond shape: Ls-Lg provides
the highest level of utility and the lowest level of pri-
vacy; Hs-Hg provides the highest level of privacy but
the lowest level of utility; Ls-Hg provides a better level
of (location) privacy than Hs-Lg and a lower level of
utility. This last observation is quite intuitive as ge-
ographical obfuscation is expected to protect location
privacy better than semantic obfuscation and semantic
obfuscation has been proved to be more detrimental to
utility than geographical obfuscation has been [4]. This
means that, as far as geographical location privacy is
concerned, users should always prefer Ls-Hg over Hs-
Lg. As for semantic location privacy (which we analyze
in detail in the next sub-section), it can be observed
that geographical obfuscation is quite beneficial as the
use of high geographical obfuscation substantially in-
creases the users’ semantic location privacy at a cost of
a small decrease in utility. In the case where low seman-
tic obfuscation is used, the semantic location privacy is
zero as the users reveal the actual semantic tags of their
locations.
×
travel & transport place −→ hotel
Fig. 8. Illustration of the obfuscation levels used in the exper-
iments. Light blue frames denote low levels of obfuscations
whereas dark blue frames denote high levels of obfuscation.
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Fig. 9. Privacy vs. Utility in four different scenarios (Ls-Lg, Hs-
Lg, Ls-Hg, Hs-Hg, for λ = 0.2).
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4.3.3 Semantic Location Privacy
Finally, we evaluate the semantic location privacy and
present the loss of privacy in the semantic dimension of
location. As in the figures depicting geographical loca-
tion privacy, we plot the aggregated privacy-level over
all users, all simulation iterations and all user events
using box plots. The semantic location privacy is calcu-
lated as the expected error of the adversary.
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Fig. 10. Semantic location privacy levels over different protection
scenarios with geographical and semantic background knowledge
of the adversary.
In Figure 10, we present the semantic location-
privacy results for 4 × 4 obfuscation with hiding prob-
ability λ in both ‘Geographical background’ and ‘Ge-
ographical & Semantic Background’ scenarios. In both
cases (shown separately in figures 10a and 10b), as we
protect the semantic information in the users’ traces less
and less (from the lightest boxes to the darkest ones),
the semantic location privacy consistently decreases. We
also observe that protecting the geographical location
privacy more, i.e., increasing the hiding probability λ,
also helps increase the semantic location privacy in most
of the cases. Whereas, semantic location privacy is nat-
urally always 0 in the case of disclosing semantic in-
formation all the time. Moreover, unsurprisingly, when
the adversary has semantic background information in
addition to the geographical one, he learns more about
the users’ location semantics in his inference, i.e., the se-
mantic location privacy decreases. However, compared
to the geographical dimension, this decrease in the se-
mantic location privacy is more substantial as can be
seen in Figures 10a and 10b: Even if the semantic tags
of the user events are hidden all the time, the privacy
loss is between 30-50%. The loss reaches up to 80% in
other protection scenarios.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we presented a semantic-aware location
inference scheme, which we tested against several simple
privacy-protection mechanisms (PPM), to prove that
the threat on location privacy is more acute when the
semantic dimension of location is taken into account.
However, this is just a first step towards developing
smarter PPMs, which take into account the semantic
dimension of location privacy (together with the geo-
graphical dimension). The results we demonstrated in
this work serve an important purpose: Understanding
how to develop joint PPMs that protect geographical
and semantic location privacy together and by taking
into account user history and profiles. Our work enables
evaluation of such PPMs by paving the way for testing
and adapting them w.r.t. the success of the adversary in
an adaptive manner as well as optimizing jointly privacy
and utility. As part of future work, we plan to use this
framework to develop smarter PPMs. For instance, we
intend to consider PPMs such as “If the cloaking area
contains only one Burger joint opened at the considered
time instant, either increase the size of the cloaking area
or use the parent semantic tag, depending on which op-
tion brings the lowest utility loss”. Another option is
to implement warning mechanisms that interferes with
user actions whenever a user wants to check-in at spe-
cific sensitive places and warns the user of the privacy
risks. Such an approach would increase the awareness
of users in addition to providing sufficiently protected
privacy levels.
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A first limitation of this work is the fact that the
adversary we considered uses a basic user behavioral
model. As such, the results we present constitute a lower
bound on the privacy loss: The adversary can actually
strengthen his attack by increasing the complexity of
the model he uses. For instance, he could exploit the
temporal properties of locations and semantics: Users
tend to have periodic routines (e.g., daily/weekly), such
as staying home at night, going to work or school during
the day and having lunch around noon, and venues have
characteristic opening hours. By taking into account the
time dimension, we could show that the threat is ac-
tually greater than what we demonstrate. Furthermore,
the information we considered is in fact a subset of what
a typical adversary (i.e., a service provider) can collect.
The fact that the adversary has access to geographic and
semantic profiles (i.e., background information) may be
considered as rather strong. However, such knowledge
can be built not only from obfuscated traces, but also
by aggregating the data of several similar users, thus
building more generic models (as done by Foursquare
for next place recommendations).
A second limitation of this work is the size and
the nature of the dataset: We considered “only” 1065
users (whom we have only little demographic informa-
tion about) in six cities, who linked their Foursquare
and Twitter accounts and made the tweets generated
by Foursquare public. Such a sampling method could
introduce a bias in the experimental results. Moreover,
the grid size is rather small, especially as the obfus-
cated regions can be as large as 4×4. Finally, the time
granularity of our dataset is somewhat coarse. As part
of future work, we will work on increasing the size and
quality of our user dataset and better characterizing the
users it contains in order to make our experimental re-
sults more generalizable. It would also be interesting to
use traces from location-based social networks (and the
associated tag hierarchy) other than Foursquare.
6 Related Work
A large amount of work has been devoted to quantify-
ing location privacy, in particular when extra informa-
tion (i.e., different from location information e.g., co-
locations and location semantics) is available to the ad-
versary. [2] is one of the first papers to identify and
study inference attacks on location traces. Another no-
table example, on which our work is partially built, is
presented in [3, 11]. In these papers, the authors propose
a formal framework to quantify users’ location privacy
when some (obfuscated) location information is avail-
able to the adversary. Their proposed framework re-
lies on hidden Markov models for the location inference
process and uses the expected error of the adversary
as a metric for location privacy. The work presented
in this paper enriches this framework by incorporating
the rich semantic information increasingly disclosed by
users on social networks. Note that Shokri’s framework
can be used as is to include semantic information by
defining a location as a couple (geographical location,
semantic location). This however, makes existing tech-
niques for background construction inefficient due to the
sparsity of the transition data (although many transi-
tions go from one geographical region to another, the
number of transitions from a couple (region, seman-
tic tag) to another is significantly reduced). Also, re-
cent work have shown that moving from Hidden Markov
Models to Bayesian networks enables the adversary to
take into account more complex information such as co-
location [12]. The main differences between our work
and Shokri et al.’s are (1) the use of general Bayesian
networks to model users’ behavior and (2) a two-step
background construction (i.e., first semantic, then geo-
graphical) to deal with sparse data. Similarly, but or-
thogonal, to our work, in [12], the authors study the ef-
fect of co-location information (e.g., Alice and Bob are
at the same (unknown) location at 2pm) on users’ loca-
tion privacy. As for obfuscation mechanisms, a detailed
survey can be found in [1].
On the front of location semantics, several works
study the semantic dimension of location information
(some of them in the context of privacy). Several works,
including [8], [13], [14] and [15], address the problem
of identifying the points-of-interest (POIs) users visit,
based on location traces. Unlike our work, these works
do not consider semantic information reported by the
users. Hence, obfuscating semantic information is not
directly possible. Barak et al. propose an anonymization
technique based on semantic cloaking, that is, replacing
actual coordinates by personal semantic labels such as
‘home’ (by opposition to the universal labels we con-
sidered, such as ‘restaurant’) [16]. Some works extend
existing location privacy metrics and definitions to take
semantics into account. For instance, in [14], the authors
propose a location-cloaking technique that ensures that
the reported regions have a high semantic diversity in
terms of the number of distinct venue types in the area.
In [17], the authors propose the PROBE framework for
implementing efficient, semantic-aware and personalized
location cloaking. The concept of semantic diversity was
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originally formalized as l-diversity in [18] followed by re-
lated models including p-sensitivity [19], location diver-
sity [20] and t-closeness [21]. Again, these works focus
mostly on providing formal semantic location privacy
guarantees by obfuscating location information, whereas
our work considers both geographical and semantic in-
formation and investigates the privacy implications on
both dimensions, based on statistical inference. Simi-
larly, in [22], the authors extend the concept of geo-
distinguishability, which applies differential privacy to
location privacy [23], to take into account the semantic
diversity of the reported locations. Differential privacy-
based frameworks and inference-based frameworks are
fundamentally different in their approach to privacy
quantification. In [24], the authors propose the notion
of C-safety, which not only takes into account seman-
tics but also the sensitivity (in terms of privacy) of the
different venue types. Using a taxonomy of venue types,
the authors propose an efficient semantic-aware obfus-
cation mechanism. Our work distinguishes itself from
existing works as it incorporates semantic information
in the inference process to better recover the users’ loca-
tions, thus demonstrating the sensitive nature and the
associated privacy risks of semantic information.
Finally, complementary to our approach, in [4], the
authors study the implications of geographical and se-
mantic obfuscation (through generalization) of users’
check-ins on their perceived utility; in the evaluation of
our work, we make use of the predictive model proposed
in this paper.
In the general context of location sharing, a number
of cryptographic protocols have been proposed (e.g., [25]
for private and cheat-proof “mayorship”-badges, one
of the main feature of location-based social networks,
and [26, 27] for sharing location with friends with-
out the service provider learning the users’ locations).
Such solutions, however, involve cryptographic opera-
tions and require technical modifications of the service.
Related cryptographic protocols, which provide privacy-
preserving features, are proposed in [28] and [29]. They
rely on secure multy-party computations (garbled cir-
cuits) and homomorphic encryption schemes, respec-
tively. Such approaches can be applied to, for instance,
friend-finding applications without revealing user loca-
tions, but they require careful analysis and extension to
incorporate the semantic dimension of location. These
mechanisms aim to provide privacy-preserving features
in specific applications, and it is not straightforward to
modify them in order to cover the cases where people
want to disclose their current activities, i.e., their loca-
tion semantics.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the effects of loca-
tion semantics on geographical location privacy of mo-
bile users. We have considered two essential scenarios,
specifically the case when an adversary, without know-
ing the semantic mobility patterns of the users, exploits
the publicly available semantic information on locations,
and secondly the case when the adversary knows the se-
mantic mobility patterns of the users, in addition to
knowing the location semantics. We have modeled the
adversary that is aware of location semantics by us-
ing Bayesian networks and demonstrated that disclosing
any level of semantic information on the visited loca-
tions improves his success.
In summary, both the geographical and semantic
location privacy are at greater risk than revealed be-
fore, due to the multidimensional nature of location
data. When designing privacy-protection mechanisms,
our aim must be to protect location privacy on a mul-
tidimensional scale, i.e., considering the types of loca-
tions. Furthermore, because we believe that people have
similar behavior patterns, we intend to analyze the ef-
fect of collective mobility patterns on location privacy.
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Appendices
Analysis of the effect of α (Eq. (1))
In this appendix, we present the preliminary results
of our analysis of the effect of parameter α (used in
the transition probabilities of the Bayesian model, see
Eq. (1)), in the case where the adversary has access
to both geographical and semantic background infor-
mation. In Figure 11, we plot the geographical location
privacy obtained for different values of α (with mixed
hiding probabilities). We observe that with increasing α
(i.e., prioritizing geographical information over seman-
tic information), users obtain higher location privacy
(i.e., the adversary is less successful) when they disclose
the semantic tag. However, in the cases of hiding the
semantic tags and parent-tag cloaking with hiding, the
α value has less effect. This shows that an actual ad-
versary could and should tune the model used in the
attack, based on his observations, in order to improve
the performance of the inference.
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Fig. 11. Effect of parameter α on the users’ geographical location
privacy.
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the root of the category tree.
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Table 5. Example of obfuscated check-ins with different combinations of geographical and semantic obfuscation (source: [4]).
Obfuscation levels Example
Original check-in The Westin Hotel, 320 N Dearborn St. (Chicago 60654, IL, United States)
Low semantic, Low geographical (Ls-Lg) At a hotel, on Dearborn St. (Chicago 60654, IL, United States)
High semantic, Low geographical (Hs-Lg) At a travel & transport place, on Dearborn St. (Chicago 60654, IL, United States)
Low semantic, High geographical (Ls-Hg) At a hotel, in Chicago (IL, United States)
High semantic, High geographical (Hs-Hg) At a travel & transport place, in Chicago (IL, United States)
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Fig. 14. Foursquare venue and check-in heat maps (i.e., count distribution) in six cities from the raw dataset.
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